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Role Distance:  On Stage and On the Merry-Go-Round
Robert Cohen
No issue in acting theory has been more discussed over the past twenty-ﬁve 
centuries than whether an actor should simply manifest his or her part through 
some sort of technical virtuosity, or experience the role through a process of 
emotional self-transportation. It is a dialectic Joseph Roach considers “the historic, 
continuing, and apparently inexhaustible combat between technique and inspiration 
in performance theory,”1 and its roots are indeed ancient. Plato, around 395 BC, 
provides us with a dialogue between Socrates and one Ion of Ephesus, a reciter of 
rhapsodic poetry, in which the philosopher asks Ion if, while publicly reciting his 
works, the performer is in his “right mind,” or if his “soul” is rather transported, 
“in ecstasy . . . among the persons or the places of which you are speaking?” 
Ion answers that he is indeed in a transported state, but then adds that he also 
looks down from the stage at his spectators so as to “behold the various emotions 
. . . stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking.”2 Swedish theorist 
Teddy Brunius calls this “Ion’s hook,”3 suggesting that the rhapsodist employed 
a double-consciousness, being ecstatic and rational—and one might even say 
entrepreneurial—at the same time. Martin Puchner locates this hook historically, 
at the tipping point when the rhapsode “switches from the third person to the ﬁrst” 
and “rhapsodic diegesis [narration, reportage] turns into the mimesis [imitation, 
embodiment] performed by an actor.”4 
Beyond these Attic sources, Ion’s hook is easy to trace through oft-cited 
authors across the millennia—Horace and Quintilian in the classical world, Denis 
Diderot’s “actor’s paradox” in the Enlightenment,5 and virtually all present day 
acting theorists. By the twentieth century, Ion’s hook had re-emerged in the slightly 
altered form of the seemingly-polarized theories put forward by the two towering 
director-theorists of the age:  Konstantin Stanislavsky in Russia and Bertolt Brecht 
in Germany, with Stanislavsky famously promoting perezhivanie (experiencing, 
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or living the part) and Brecht counter-proposing verfremdung (standing artfully 
distanced, estranged or alienated from it). In the theatre world today, two full 
generations after each man has died, actors and directors continue to posit Ion’s 
dialectic as between modernist “Stanislavskian” and “Brechtian” approaches.6 
This dialectic, however, should not be limited merely to a consideration of 
theatrical styles, for the distinction between experiencing and estranging one’s 
“role” is a factor in ordinary life-behavior as well as the theatre. Erving Goffman’s 
notion of “role distance,” described in his 1961 essay under that title,7 deﬁnes 
a relationship between real-life role experiencing and role estranging that has 
important implications for acting. Goffman was not writing about theatre in this 
essay, of course; he was employing a theatrical metaphor to describe psychosocial 
behavior, just as he did in later books such as The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life. But we can usefully turn Goffman’s metaphor back upon its dramaturgical 
source. 
Role distance is Goffman’s term for “actions which effectively convey some 
disdainful detachment of the [real life] performer from a role he is performing.”8 
And the author’s subsequent discussion of this subject throws light upon the signiﬁer 
(theatre) as well as the signiﬁed (life). Goffman develops his idea after observing 
children of various ages riding a merry-go-round. Two year-olds, he discovers, 
cannot maintain sufﬁcient “role poise” to maintain physical, and hence emotional, 
security under the multi-directional movement vectors the machine creates; they 
therefore “ﬁnd the prospect too much for them.” Three- and four-year-olds, 
however, undertake the task rapturously. “The task of riding a wooden horse is still 
a challenge, but apparently a manageable one, inﬂating the rider to his full extent 
with demonstrations of capacity.” At three and four, “the rider throws himself into 
the role in a serious way, playing it with verve and an admitted engagement of all 
his faculties.” Goffman concludes that for this age group “doing is being, and what 
was designed as a ‘playing at’ is stamped with serious realization.”9 This merger of 
doing and being Goffman terms an “embracement” of the performer’s “role.” 
But at age ﬁve, everything changes again. “To be a merry-go-round horse 
rider is now apparently not enough, and this fact must be demonstrated out of 
dutiful regard for one’s own character.” By ﬁve, “irreverence begins, and the child 
“leans back, stands on the saddle, holds on to the horse’s wooden ear, and says 
by his actions:  ‘Whatever I am, I’m not just someone who can barely manage to 
stay on a wooden horse.’” The rider is hence “apologizing,” not for “some minor 
untoward event that has cropped up during the interaction, but the whole role.”10 
“Whether this skittish behavior is intentional or unintentional, sincere or affected, 
correctly appreciated by others present or not, it constitutes a wedge between the 
individual and his role, between doing and being,” Goffman concludes.11 This 
wedge is role distance.
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Role distance expands from age ﬁve forward. By seven and eight, Goffman 
ﬁnds, the child “not only disassociates himself self-consciously from the kind 
of horseman a merry-go-round allows him to be but also ﬁnds that many of the 
devices that younger people use for this are now beneath him. He rides no-hands, 
gleefully chooses a tiger or a frog for a steed, clasps hands with a mounted friend 
across the aisle. He tests limits.”12 By eleven and twelve the ride has become solely 
“a lark, a situation for mockery.” Adult riders carry role distance even further: 
“Riding close by their threatened two-and-a-half year-old, [they] wear a face that 
carefully demonstrates that they do not perceive the ride as an event in itself, their 
only present interest being their child.” As does the adult who runs the machine: 
“Not only does he show the ride itself is not—as a ride—an event to him, but he 
also gets off and on and around the moving platform with a grace and ease that 
can only be displayed by safely taking what for children and even adults would 
be chances.”13
Goffman extends his notion beyond children and the merry-go-round, 
describing role distance in adult performance, both professional and social. The 
operating room surgeon sings obscene ditties while wielding the scalpel so as to 
assure co-physicians and staff that beneath his professional role rests an emotionally 
stable human being. The Manhattan waitress smirks to show that beneath her 
apron is “really” a yet-unsung poet or stage performer. “Know that I am not who 
I appear to be” is the message such “distancy” (as Goffman sometimes calls it) 
telegraphs. Role distance may also be employed to preempt criticism. The mayor 
tossing out the ﬁrst ball of the season does so in a deliberately cockeyed fashion, 
hoping to sidetrack the crowd’s realization that his fast ball isn’t what it used to 
be. The difﬁdent suitor seeking to impress his date at a French restaurant swirls 
the sommelier’s wine sample with a mockingly supercilious air, feigning disdain 
for a tasting ritual that makes him uncomfortable. Such behaviors demonstrate the 
prevalence of role distance in everyday lives:  We do not wish to be seen either as 
locked into—or as failing to live up to—our put-on adult roles. 
It is almost impossible to overstate the importance of Goffman’s ﬁndings to 
the theorization, pedagogy, and evaluation of acting. If, as it is colloquially said, 
actors are basically children,14 Goffman proves the point—at least for those in the 
Stanislavskian model—going so far as to locate the precise age of such juvenility: 
it is three to four years old, when a child fully embraces “play” and melds “doing 
and being.” Goffman elaborates the three year-old’s role embracement in terms 
that describe the Stanislavskian dramatic ideal:  “To embrace a role is to disappear 
completely into the virtual self available in the situation, to be fully seen in terms 
of the image, and to conﬁrm expressively one’s acceptance of it. To embrace a role 
is to be embraced by it.”15 Goffman’s three-year old merry-go-round rider thus 
provides not only a perfect illustration of the Russian’s perezhivanie, but of the of 
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the celebrated American acting teacher Sanford Meisner’s fundamental goal for 
the actor:  “living truthfully under imaginary circumstances.”16 
Conversely, the role distance that Goffman discovers in the ﬁve year-old 
succinctly describes the very verfremdung or estrangement that Brecht sought in 
his epic theatre performances. If the three year-old lives the role, the ﬁve year-old 
coolly presents and critiques it. Such demonstrations of distancy, Goffman asserts, 
“allow one to show that something of oneself lies outside the constraints of the 
moment and outside the role.”17 Brecht applied this notion deliberately, asking his 
actors to “demonstrate” and “critique” their roles rather than to incarnate or inﬂesh 
them. The “Brechtian actor,” as Brecht describes, expresses a “socially critical” 
view of his or her own performance, which “emphasizes that it is his (actor’s) own 
account” of the character performed.18 
Goffman’s ﬁndings make clear that the difference between perezhivanie and 
verfremdung is not merely a theatrical dialectic but a direct parallel of a totally 
normal process in human maturation:  role distance and role embracement being 
equally real-world behaviors of which Stanislavskian and Brechtian performance 
models are their respective stage-world equivalents. Neither acting model can 
then be absolutely prioritized as more “real” or “authentic” than the other:  The 
ideal Brechtian actor, no less than her Stanislavskian counterpart, performs a role 
authentically (i.e., in a true to life manner) even when showing that, as Goffman 
asserts, “something of [her actual] self lies outside . . . the moment and outside 
the role.” A Brechtian actor is therefore “authentic,” under proper circumstances, 
because estrangement itself is authentic, and being “outside . . . the moment” can 
be as true to life as being “in the moment.” 
Understanding the real-life aspects of these terms can both clarify and demystify 
several important issues encountered in acting theory, acting pedagogy, and—most 
vexingly—in the rehearsal room. These are often simply described in overripe 
moral terms, such as breaches of an actor’s “honesty” or “sincerity.” This, however, 
obscures the important psychosociological—as well as aesthetic—distinctions 
between embracement and estrangement in both role and actor. In realistic plays, for 
example, role-distanced performance is usually what acting teachers and directors 
call, simply, “bad acting.”19  It certainly is bad acting in these circumstances, of 
course, because outside of a theatre of deliberate verfremdung such estrangement 
reveals an actor’s inability (or refusal) to engage fully in “play”—particularly the 
sort of play comparable to the “child’s play” that lies at the heart of the “adult play” 
of acting (in plays). But it is bad acting of a very special case. We see it routinely in 
the high school rehearsal room, for example, when teenagers erupt in giggles when 
asked to perform as characters they see as noticeably unlike themselves—as, for 
example, more sophisticated, brutal, or sentimental as they would wish to appear 
to their classmates, or as having a different gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation 
than their own. Being asked to “put on” what they consider affected postures, 
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accents, mannerisms, or costumes may throw them into awkwardly-suppressed 
embarrassment, which they seek to cover by covertly critiquing the very behaviors 
they are asked to embrace, thus showing off “cool” behaviors distinct from the 
“hotter” ones they have been asked to play. But even experienced actors may, for 
various reasons, ﬁnd themselves unable to fully participate in such dramatic play 
and become physically stiff and vocally monotonic when asked to do so, thus 
undermining their own performances. Such persons are not best described as simply 
“dishonest” or “insincere.” Rather, they are holding on to Goffman’s “dutiful regard 
for [their] own [real-life] character” and are, as it were, unconsciously signaling 
that they are not really foppish or female or brutal or sentimental or upper-class—or 
indeed anything other than their everyday selves. Role embracement, after all, may 
carry with it the perceived threat of identity effacement, as well as of accusations 
of deceit and hypocrisy (a word derived from the Greek hypocrites—or “actor”).20 
Addressing this in the rehearsal hall becomes problematical when treated simply 
as a moral failure—an actor’s lack of honesty or sincerity—or as an ontological 
breakdown, described as the actor’s inability to “be real” (the popular actors’ term 
in the 1950s), or to “commit to the role” (60s), to “get in the here and now” (70s), 
to “be in the moment” (80s), to “authentically experience the part” (90s), or to “own 
the role” (00s). Such critiques of performance portraying “the real” against—by 
implication—“the false” both misstate the technical distinction and overstate the 
moral or ontological one. What is necessary, in such cases, is not for the actor to 
progress into a generic and ill-deﬁned world of “reality” but to regress into the role 
embracement of the three year-old. This is neither moral or ontological. It is rather 
a matter of rediscovering the art of play within the art of playing. 
Since it is “real,” role distance exists even in the realistic theatre when a 
dramatic character exhibits it—as does, for example, Reverend Tooker as described 
by Tennessee Williams in this stage direction in Cat on a Hot Tin Roof:  “Tooker 
appears in the gallery doors, his head slightly, playfully, fatuously cocked, with a 
practiced clergyman’s smile, sincere as a birdcall blown on a hunter’s whistle.”21 
An actor playing Tooker in a production of this play—whose central theme is 
‘mendacity’—is thereby asked to act Reverend Tooker’s self-mocking distance from 
the shows of piety his professional role demands.22 Similarly, an actor playing the 
prince in Shakespeare’s Hamlet might be expected to play his opening scene in a 
state of role distance—distinguishing his being from his doing—as he sarcastically 
mocks his ofﬁcial court-appointed role. “Sullenness, muttering, irony, joking, 
and sarcasm may all allow one to show that something of oneself lies outside 
the constraints of the moment and outside the role within whose jurisdiction the 
moment occurs,” Goffman observes,23 in words that clearly may be applied to the 
Shakespeare’s Danish Prince as well as Salinger’s Holden Caulﬁeld and disaffected 
teenage sons or daughters everywhere.
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But it is with Brecht’s notion of verfremdungseffekt that role distance takes, 
as it were, center stage, providing an encompassing frame for the epic stage 
productions in which the theorist/playwright/director asked the actor to distance 
herself from her role in service to an “historicizing theatre,” where “an actress must 
not make the sentence her own affair, she must hand it over for criticism, she must 
help us to understand its causes and protest.”24 This places role distance directly 
in the actor’s hands as actor, not as character, and not even as actor-on-behalf-of 
character. In Brecht, the actor places his own person into the staged proceedings in 
order to present “his own (actor’s) account, view, version” of the play’s incidents 
and actions.25 
Indeed, to Brecht, it was the audience that was to be the child. And, as Brecht 
surprisingly posits, a child on a merry-go-round! 
For the spectator wants to be in possession of quite deﬁnite 
sensations, just as a child does when it climbs on to one of the 
horses on a roundabout:  the sensation of pride that it can ride, 
and has a horse; the pleasure of being carried, and whirled past 
other children; the adventurous daydreams in which it pursues 
others or is pursued, etc. In leading the child to experience all 
this the degree to which its wooden seat resembles a horse counts 
little, nor does it matter that the ride is conﬁned to a small circle. 
The one important point for the spectators in these houses is 
that they should be able to swap a contradictory world for a 
consistent one, one that they scarcely know for one of which 
they can dream.26 
Brecht, therefore, not only reverses the “ontological age” of the Stanislavskian actor 
from child to adult, he also reverses the audience’s ontological age from adult to 
child. It’s a double-reversal. 
But if Brecht’s audience is composed of children, they are “children of the 
scientiﬁc age” and must be addressed empirically, by “actor-scientists,” skilled at 
“self-observation” and the “artistic act of self-alienation.” The estranged acting 
that Brecht desires is not simply “bad acting.” The Verfremdungseffekt, Brecht 
asserts, “can only be got by long training.”27 What can propel such training to a 
good start is the understanding that estranged performance is not simply a variant 
acting technique, but an outgrowth of the normal human phenomenon we have been 
discussing. This requires relearning how to act as a teenager and how to present a 
role while also maintaining Goffman’s “dutiful regard for one’s own character.”28 
The helpful aspect of Goffman’s teaching is that we already know how to do 
this—we have been doing it since we were ﬁve. The only trick is remembering 
how we did it, and why, and how it felt.
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It is also helpful, in this regard, to recognize that Goffman did not limit 
himself to placing role embracement and role distance simply as absolutely bi-
polar performative behaviors but rather as disparate points on a continuum of real-
world self-identiﬁcation, on which we can ﬁnd discrete gradations of role distance 
appearing at age ﬁve, eight, eleven, and adult years. Brechtian on-stage estrangement 
can likewise be incrementalized across a continuum ranging from “short” to “long” 
distance. The stage utterances of Shen Te in Brecht’s Good Person of Szechuan, 
for example, range from conversational-like prose dialogue, to singing, to poetic 
recitation, to audience interaction, to direct address. Indeed, an actor playing Shen 
Te will probably wish to differentiate points on the role distance continuum even 
within one-on-one dialogue scenes with other characters:  In the direction of role 
embracement in scenes with Yang Sun, her lover, and towards role estrangement 
in her more political dialogues with the capitalist Shu Fu, in which the actor 
playing Shen Te, in Brechtian fashion, would retain that “something of oneself” 
that Goffman sees as crucial to real-world distance and Brecht sees as a need to 
“protest” her role and “hand it over for criticism” (per above), thus conveying 
Brecht’s—and the actor’s—own political commentary and perspective.
Brecht did not invent role estrangement, of course. Nor did Ion. We can see it 
throughout Aristophanes, the world’s ﬁrst postmodern playwright, whose characters 
frequently (if not always) stand aside from their pretended real-life counterparts 
to create a theatricalized reality that doubles the phenomenological one—through 
exaggerated masks and phalloi, asides and pratfalls, and particularly in the mocking, 
metatheatrical parabasis (author’s address, though probably played by an actor) with 
its audience-enchanting self-ridicule. Role distancing—speciﬁcally by mocking 
one’s theatrical and hence ﬁctive identity—is also implicit when dramatic characters 
self-reference their “actoriality” in any theatrical era, as they do, for example, in 
Shakespeare (“If this were played upon a stage now, I could condemn it as an 
improbable ﬁction,” says Fabian in Twelfth Night), Shaw (“Sooner than that, I 
would stoop to the lowest depths of my profession . . . and be an actress,” says Lina 
in Misalliance) and Beckett (“I’m warming up for my last soliloquy,” says Hamm 
in Endgame).29 So, for an actor seeking work in the Western dramatic repertory, 
mastering role distance is as essential as mastering role embracement.30 
Taking control of what is essentially a natural process, however, is no simple 
task; one doesn’t easily reverse (or accelerate) one’s lifelong psychobiological 
process of maturation. Developing the acting skills needed to move freely along the 
role embracement/distance continuum requires, at minimum, an understanding of 
the conditions of its emergence in everyday life, where it is not merely a theatrical 
technique but a survival tool. For the ﬁve year-old, role distance establishes (and 
signals) independence and maturity, distinguishing today’s child from yesterday’s 
infant and offering the emerging youngster acceptance in his or her simultaneously 
emerging peer society. Goffman’s ﬁndings conﬁrm the obvious:  The ﬁve year-old 
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seeks to leave childish innocence—and more importantly the impression of childish 
innocence—behind. Children therefore adore birthdays and similar rites of passage 
that mark seemingly irreversible advances in power, dignity, and prestige. A drive 
to maturity makes pre-teens want to smoke, drink, curse, and dress/undress sexily, 
all in efforts to distance themselves from the babies they once were, and compete 
in the group they wish to join. “You’re so immature!” is an insult of the highest 
order in a pre-teen society. Role distancing surfaces as a disdain for one’s infancy, 
and testiﬁes to an advancing social position, and an adult (or neo-adult) authority. 
No wonder it is psychologically problematical for actors to reverse this maturation 
process when asked to embrace roles in a childlike “play” environment, when they 
have been struggling so hard to live such roles in an adult, existential world. The 
process of human maturation is virtually an etiology of “bad acting” disease, at least 
as viewed in its Stanislavskian model, and curing this disease is a tall order. 
How does the actor give up this socially desirable estrangement in order to fully 
embrace, in the Stanislavskian sense, a purely ﬁctive stage role? And, conversely, 
how does a Brechtian actor present that “something of oneself” while simultaneously 
engaging in simulations of human conversation that even in Brecht’s plays must 
be at least credible enough, on a human level, to generate dramatic engagement 
and momentum to climax? A pedagogy of childlike role embracement has been 
integrated into actor training since at least the 1950s with the employment of 
actual children’s games (e.g., “Come Over Red Rover”) into the beginning acting 
curriculum and rehearsal hall; this movement, once ridiculed in both academic and 
professional quarters, gained both academic legitimacy and international currency 
with the studies and practices of Viola Spolin and her followers, including both 
teachers and directors, who have invented speciﬁc “theatre games” and playful 
improvisations to suffuse the notion of child’s play into adult playing.31 Other 
pedagogical techniques include the “Round Robin” classroom acting exercise, 
where multiple (but differing) scenes are performed simultaneously by an entire 
acting group, several times in immediate succession in a single room, thus creating 
a “playground atmosphere” in which, after conquering an inevitable initial level 
of distraction, actors can more fully embrace their “in play” actions without the 
greater distraction of an “audience” to whom they feel a need to indicate their 
real-life (adult) persona.32
And the “long training” that Brecht considered necessary to properly perform 
the verfremdungseffekt is best achieved by a full consideration of the root causes 
of role distance, thereby permitting the actor to develop this capability through 
disciplined intentionality rather than falling back on simply the “bad acting” caused 
by ontological insecurity. A starting exercise for exploring role distance in life is 
simply to go back to Goffman’s ﬁrst observation and ride, with some friends, on 
the local merry-go-round, running the age gamut from three to thirteen and thereby 
spiraling from embracement to estrangement on a whirling carousel.
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Addressing both the high potential and the crucial problems of both employing 
and reducing role distance in acting performances requires addressing complex and 
largely disguised theoretical issues of social, cultural, and age-related identity. But 
the understanding that follows has the opportunity of delivering, in addition to a 
theoretical extrapolation of Ion’s hook, extremely useful tools for making sound 
dramaturgical distinctions and uncovering root causes of fundamental acting 
problems at clear-headed (and refreshingly non-moralistic and non-psychiatric) 
levels.
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